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AGGRAVATION OUTSIDE COVERED EMPLOYMENT
OF PRIOR INDUSTRIAL INJURY IS COMPENSABLE
In 1955, claimant suffered a sacroiliac strain while working within
employment covered by the Washington Industrial Insurance Act. His
compensation claim was closed with an award of $1,800 and a determi-
nation of thirty per cent permanent partial disability. Three years later,
while visiting a relative, claimant unloaded some heavy sacks of grain
and carried them from a truck into a storage building. He was obliged
to undergo medical treatment the next day for pain and stiffness in his
back. Claimant's application to readjust his previous award was re-
jected by the Department of Labor and Industries on the ground that
he had sustained a new injury while working outside covered employ-
ment.' The Department's position was upheld by the Board of Indus-
trial Insurance Appeals and the trial court. On appeal, the Washington
Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Held: If a claimant acts rea-
sonably in light of a disability which has resulted from a previously
compensated industrial injury, subsequent aggravation suffered outside
covered employment is attributable to that disability. McDougle v.
Department of Labor & Indus., 64 Wn.2d 653, 393 P.2d 631 (1964).
In the principal case, the primary industrial injury occurred within
covered employment but the secondary, aggravating injury occurred
outside covered employment. Two other aggravation fact patterns
should be distinguished: First, if a particular industrial injury causes
far more serious complications than it would cause normally, due to
physical conditions peculiar to the workman, compensation is allowed
for all disability if such disability can be medically shown to have
resulted directly from the industrial injury.2 Second, if an industrial
injury increases a pre-existing disability which originated independently
I WASH. REV. CODE § 51.32.160 (1961): "Aggravation, diminution, or termination.
If aggravation, diminution, or termination of disability takes place or be discovered
after the rate of compensation shall have been established or compensation terminated
... the division of industrial insurance, may, upon application of the beneficiary, made
within five years after the establishment or termination of such compensation... read-
just... the rate of compensation. ... " A claimant seeking to readjust a previous award
is required to show by medical evidence based on objective symptoms a percentage
increase in the degree of his established disability. Phillips v. Department of Labor &
Indus., 49 Wn2d 195, 298 P.2d 1117 (1956) ; Moses v. Department of Labor & Indus.,
44 Wn.2d 511, 268 P.2d 665 (1954) ; State ex rel. Stone v. Olinger, 6 Wn.2d 643, 108
P2d 630 (1940). Other states also require comparative evidence of aggravation which
shows a percentage increase in the original degree of disability. See 2 LARSON, WORK-
MEN'S COMPENSATION § 81.33 (1952, Supp. 1964).
2 See, e.g., Lunday v. Department of Labor & Indus., 200 Wash. 620, 94 P.2d 744(1939) ; 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 13.11, 192.60 (rev. 1964).
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of the employment in which the workman's industrial injury arose, com-
pensation is allowed for all disability if the disability can be medically
shown to have resulted directly from the industrial injury.' The char-
acter of the claimant's conduct is immaterial in these two fact patterns
because the activating force behind the claimant's entire disability
originates within covered employment. However, the problem posed by
the fact pattern in the principal case is to determine the limits of com-
pensability when aggravation occurring subsequent to an industrial
injury, and arising outside the course of covered employment, allegedly
results from the claimant's contributory fault.
The only generally reliable statement about this problem is that "the
legal principles involved are not capable of being reduced to some
simple unitary formula."4 Courts have frequently dealt with the prob-
lem in the confusing and artificial language of legal causation. For
example, in Matter of Sullivan v. B & A Constr., Inc.,' the claimant
had practically lost the use of his leg as a result of two industrial acci-
dents. While driving on personal business, his knee locked, preventing
use of the brake. The court held that compensation for the secondary
injuries suffered in the auto crash was
warranted only if... the consequent injuries resulted directly and natu-
rally from claimant's prior injuries and the disability thereby produced.
... If such injuries only remotely caused or contributed to the secondary
injury, then claimant is not entitled to compensation;... if claimant is to
recover, the disability occasioned by the earlier accidents must have been
a proximate, not simply a 'but for' cause of his latest mishap."
However, a California court has emphatically stated that reliance upon
contributory fault to deny further benefits for subsequent aggravation
not arising from covered employment is an example of "atavistic
attempts to retain common-law concepts in the compensation field."'
According to this court, only negligence that is "an intervening cause
which itself is the sole and exclusive cause of the ultimate injury"" will
bar further benefits. The New Hampshire court has based denial of
further benefits upon the policy of the workmen's compensation laws to
3 See, e.g., Miller v. Department of Labor & Indus., 200 Wash. 674, 682-83, 94 P.2d
764, 768 (1939) ; 1 LAsoN, op. cit. supra note 2, § 13.11 at 192.62-.63.
41 LAasoN, op. cit. supra note 2, § 13,11 at 192.65.
5 307 N.Y. 161, 120 N.E2d 694 (1954).OId., 120 N.E.2d at 695-96.
7State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 176 Cal. App.2d 10, 1
Cal. Rptr. 73, 78 (1959).
8Id., 1 Cal. Rptr. at 78.
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
grant benefits solely for injuries which arise from the course of covered
employment.9
In the principal case the Washington court propounded a theory of
foreseeability drawn from negligence law:
The test to be applied, in cases such as the present, is whether the activity
which caused the aggravation is something the claimant might reasonably
be expected to be doing, or whether it is something that one with his dis-
ability would not reasonably be expected to be doing.... We cannot...
say that because an individual has a thirty per cent permanent partial
disability based on a back injury, that he is thereby precluded from doing
any lifting, and that any injury sustained from any lifting is not attribu-
table to his prior injury because it is an intervening cause. Whether it was
a reasonable thing for this particular claimant to do, is a different question
-never considered by the department, the Board, or the trial court."10
Although the court stated that testimony of the claimant's physician
"clearly met the requirements for reopening for further medical care,"'"
it refused to order the claimant's prior award reopened, taking the
position that the compensation authorities disposed of the case incor-
rectly because no finding was made as to the reasonableness of the
claimant's conduct in carrying the heavy sacks of grain. The court
therefore remanded the case to the compensation authorities.
In cases like the principal case, it would appear extreme to hold that
the character of the claimant's conduct is irrelevant if a medical con-
nection can be shown between the primary injury and the aggravation.
Such a holding in a recent California case12 makes the employer a con-
9 Neault v. Parker-Young Co., 86 N.H. 231, 166 Ati. 289 (1933).
10 64 Wn.2d 653, 658-59, 393 P.2d 631, 635 (1964). A contradiction is revealed
when one compares the reasonableness test in the principal case with the Washington
court's language in Anderson v. Industrial Ins. Comm'n, 116 Wash. 421, 199 Pac. 747
(1921). In this early case, a workman received a serious axe cut. Although being
cared for at work, he insisted upon going home, in spite of extremely cold weather.
Evidence showed that his exposure to the cold in his weakened condition made him
more susceptible to the pneumonia which caused his death. In allowing an award to
his widow, the court said: "There is, of course, no question of contributory negligence
or fault involved. The workman's compensation act allows compensation regardless of
questions of fault, and the fact that Mr. Anderson may have been imprudent in expos-
ing himself to the weather in his weakened condition does not militate against the right
of his widow to compensation for his death." 116 Wash. at 423, 199 Pac. at 748. This
language suggests that the workman's own negligence outside employment, which
increases the severity of his industrial injury, will never bar a further award for
increase in the injury. The reasonableness test in the principal case would require the
attempt of the decedent to go home after suffering the axe wound to be "something that
the claimant might reasonably be expected to be doing." 64 Wn.2d at 658, 393 P.2d at
635. New York once adopted the Anderson approach, Colvin v. Emmons & Whitehead,
216 App. Div. 577, 215 N.Y. Supp. 562 (1926), but apparently has abandoned it. Sulli-
avn v. B & A Constr., Inc., 307 N.Y. 161, 120 N.E2d 694 (1954). See generally Note,
38 CORNELL L.Q. 99 (1952).
1164 Wn.2d at 656, 393 P.2d at 634. See note 1 supra.
12 State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 176 Cal. App.2d 10,
1 Cal. Rptr. 73 (1959).
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tinuing insurer of the claimant after an industrial injury has occurred.
On the other hand, it would appear equally extreme to hold that any
negligent conduct on the part of the claimant will cut the causal link
between the primary injury and the aggravation. Such a holding seems
to ignore the intent of workmen's compensation acts to abolish common
law defenses based upon fault of the employee. The Washington court's
"reasonableness" test, though at odds with the policy of granting
benefits without regard to fault which underlies workmen's compensa-
tion legislation, is preferrable to such confusing artificialities as "proxi-
mate cause," "contributory cause," and "independent intervening
cause." Ambiguities are inherent in the reasonableness test and seman-
tic difficulties will doubtless be created in its application. But once
it becomes clear that an all-or-nothing rule will work injustice either to
the claimant who suffers aggravation of an injury sustained within cov-
ered employment, or to an employer who must bear the cost of the
aggravation, a test based upon the reasonableness of the claimant's
conduct seems inevitable.
Dr. Larson has attempted to formulate a comprehensive standard
defining the limits of compensability in cases like the principal case.13
Pointing out that compensability for a work-connected injury is ordi-
narily governed by the tests "arising out of employment" and "in the
course of employment," Larson concludes that compensability in such
cases cannot be determined by tests based on causation. He finds it
necessary
to contrive a new concept, which we may for convenience call 'quasi-
course of employment.' By this expression is meant activities which, al-
though they take place out of the time and space limits of the employment
... are nevertheless related to the employment in the sense that they are
necessary or reasonable activities which would not have been undertaken
but for the compensable injury. 'Reasonable' at this point refers not to
the method used, but to the category of the activity itself.14
To implement this "quasi-course of employment" test, Larson pro-
poses two corollaries: 5 (1) When an aggravating injury arises out of a
"cquasi-course"l activity as when the claimant receives negligent med-
ical treatment for the primary injury or is injured while traveling to
a hospital to obtain treatment for the primary injury, the second in-
jury's causal connection to the primary injury can be severed only by
1s1 Lsox, op. cit. supra note 2, § 13.11, at 192.67-71.




the claimant's intentional misconduct which would have been expressly
or impliedly prohibited by his employer. (2) If the aggravation does
not occur in a "quasi-course" activity, the second injury's causal con-
nection to the primary injury can be severed by any intentional or
negligent misconduct on the part of the claimant.
A major defect in Larson's "quasi-course of employment" test is
reliance upon "express or implied" employer prohibitions. Such prohi-
bitions, as safety rules or regulations against drinking on the job, if
wilfully violated, may result in denial or reduction of compensation for
injuries arising within covered employment.16 However, it seems
oppressive to rely upon an employer's prohibitions to determine com-
pensability for claimant's later conduct outside the course of employ-
ment. To minimize costs, any employer would at least "impliedly"
prohibit an injured employee from doing anything in the "quasi-course
of employment" which would increase the risk of aggravation.
In the principal case, the claimant's lifting of heavy grain sacks three
years after the original injury was not an activity which he would not
have been engaged in "but for the compensable injury." Thus, under
the second corollary to Larson's test, any negligence by the claimant
would have cut the causal connection between the primary injury and
the subsequent aggravation. Indeed, because only aggravation which
occurs in a "quasi-course" activity would be compensable, Larson's test
is nearly as restrictive as a test based upon contributory negligence,
and represents the harsh all-or-nothing approach which should be
avoided.
In the principal case, the Washington court did not make clear
whether "reasonable" refers only to the kind of activity in which the
claimant was engaged when the aggravating injury occurred, or also to
the manner in which the claimant actually performed that activity. The
court noted that a person with a disability such as the claimant's could
be anticipated to "engage in many... activities-including recreation,
taking care of his home, helping his neighbors, and in gainful employ-
ment-al commensurate witk his existing physical ability."" Because
an activity will be "reasonable" if commensurate with the claimant's
existing physical ability, the method by which the claimant attempts to
carry out a particular task should also be subject to this test. The
court's categories-recreation, care of the home, aiding the neighbors,
gainful employment-are too general to be helpful. "Recreation" en-
16 1 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 1, §§ 31.11, 32.20, 34.31.
17 64 Wn.2d at 654, 393 P.2d at 632. (Emphasis added).
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compasses a wide range of activities, and "gainful employment" in-
cludes jobs requiring no abnormal physical movement as well as work
that is very strenuous. At some point within each one of the court's
extremely general categories of "reasonable" activities, the boundary
must be drawn between reasonableness and unreasonableness of the
method chosen by the claimant to carry out the activity.
The ruling in the principal case will present troublesome questions
to an attorney representing a claimant whose alleged increase in dis-
ability did not occur in covered employment: Does the workman have
the burden of proof to show his conduct was reasonable? A claimant
does have the burden of proof to establish a medical connection be-
tween the primary injury and the aggravation 8 However, once that
connection has been established, the remedial standards of workmen's
compensation legislation suggest that unreasonableness of a claimant's
conduct should be proved by the compensation authorities or the em-
ployer. To what extent will medical testimony be conclusive of "rea-
sonableness," as well as of the relation between the primary injury
and the subsequent aggravation? The testimony of the claimant's
physician in the principal case indicated that any strain placed on the
claimant's back would temporarily aggravate his condition, and the
Washington court stated vaguely that "such testimony may have a
bearing on whether the claimant acted reasonably."'0 If the claimant,
at the time the aggravation is sustained, is engaged in an activity which
has been approved by his physician, it is likely that such an activity
would be considered "reasonable."2 On the other hand, if the claim-
ant, at the time the aggravation is sustained, is engaged in an activity
which has been forbidden by his physician, it is likely such an activity
would be considered "unreasonable." Otherwise medical testimony
will probably be confined to medical issues.21 Because "reasonable-
ness) of claimants' conduct is basically a question to be answered by
careful evaluation of the facts and circumstances of each case, the
courts may be expected to defer to the judgment of the compensation
authorities.
Is See note 1 mipra.
19 64 Wn2d at 659, 393 P2d at 635.2 0 In State Compensation Ins. Fun v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 176 Cal. App. 2d 10,
1 Cal. Rpt. 73 (1959), the claimant, a carpenter who suffered a serious eye injury
which caused blurred and double vision, was ordered by his physician to engage in
rehabilitative work at home; additional compensation was allowed when he cut off a
finger while operating a power tool.
21 But cf. Naillon v. Department of Labor & Indus, 65 Wn2d 527, 529, 398 P2d 713,
714 (1965).
